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This paper discusses the bankruptcy and restructuring that Premier Parks (“Six Flags”)
recently underwent in order to return the company to profitability. The discussion begins with a
summary of the company’s history and an introduction to the key players in the restructuring
process, including the relevant circumstances and management figures responsible for the
considerable financial problems that brought Six Flags to make a Chapter 11 filing.
Contextually significant factors such as economic and industry conditions, stakeholder
motivations, and media occurrences that were particularly relevant are examined as well. The
paper provides an account of the bankruptcy proceedings from the company’s pre-petition plan
to the court’s confirmation of the debtor’s re-organization strategy. The company’s subsequent
negotiations with its lenders and creditors along with the proposed alternative methods to
resolve Six Flags’ financial issues are also detailed. The paper concludes with a discussion of
Six Flags’ economic position post-bankruptcy, and the company’s most current market share
and forecast for the upcoming 2014 season.
I.

A HISTORY OF THE COMPANY
A.

History of Six Flags

You could say that Six Flags was an accidental success. The company was founded in
1961 by Angus G. Wynne, Jr., a Texas real estate developer who intended it to be no more than a
temporary attraction to increase funds for other projects in Arlington.1 When attendance
significantly exceeded expectations, it became apparent that the park would be a permanent
fixture.2 The park had 8,374 visitors during its grand opening on August 1, 1961, and through
the next ten years hosted 17.5 million visitors.3 The park’s founder was the son of a prominent
attorney who was the first president of the state bar of Texas.4 Wynne did not follow in his
father’s footsteps, and instead served in the Navy during World War II, eventually developing a

History, GUIDE TO SIX FLAGS OVER TEXAS, http://www.guidetosfot.com/parkinfo/history/
(last accessed Apr. 11, 2014).
1

2

Id.

Six Flags Over Texas, CAREERBUILDER, http://www.careerbuilder.com/Jobs/Company/
C8G54Q6FSBSNPSYQM3M/Six-Flags-Over-Texas/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2014); Texans
Head for the Thrills at Six Flags, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/
texans-head-for-the-thrills-at-six-flags (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
3

Joan Jenkins Perez, Wynne, Angus Gilchrist, Sr., HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE, http://
www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/fwy03 (last visited Apr. 14, 2014)
4
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successful career in real estate.5 Most notably, he was the founder and developer of Wynnewood
Village Shopping Center and Wynnewood neighborhood, both still in existence and located in
Dallas.6
Wynne had modeled Six Flags Over Texas after Disneyland which had opened in
California a few years before. However, he tweaked the business model slightly in several ways,
most notably by charging a single admission price as opposed to using the pay-as-you-go pricing
scheme that Disneyland and other similar attractions used at the time.7 This new pricing model
proved to be immensely successful and enhanced the overall popularity of the park, especially
for families who wanted to know at the outset how much they would be spending for a day at the
park. Wynne’s wife, Joanne, is credited with the park’s name when after hearing Wynne’s
original plan to call it “Texas Under Six Flags” she remarked that “Texas wasn’t under
anything.”8 Thus, Six Flags Over Texas was born, and through several ownership changes along
with significant expansion and acquisitions has multiple locations within North America.
A discussion of Six Flags is not complete without mentioning the industry behemoth that
started it all, the Disney theme parks. Despite being often and incorrectly credited as America’s
“first” theme park, Disneyland maintains the distinction of being the first theme park to
experience massive commercial success.9 Amusement parks in Coney Island and Atlantic City
had previously become considerably popular, and although not technically “theme” parks in the

5

Id.

Michelle Stanard, Wynnewood North, PRESERVATION DALLAS, http://
www.preservationdallas.org/neighborhood-resources/discover-dallas/wynnewood-north/ (last
visited Apr. 14, 2014).
6

History, GUIDE TO SIX FLAGS OVER TEXAS, http://www.guidetosfot.com/parkinfo/history/ (last
accessed Apr. 11, 2014).
7

8

Id.

Amusement & Theme Parks, GOODMAGIC.COM, http://www.goodmagic.com/websales/midway/
amuse.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
9
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sense of being built around a particular story or “theme,” these parks shared many similarities to
Disneyland.10 One of the biggest differences that Disneyland offered when it opened in 1955
was a particularly clean and family-friendly atmosphere.11 The massive success that Walt
Disney had achieved in the Disneyland theme park was a result of years of planning. Disney had
first conceived of the idea after visiting several amusement parks with his daughters in the 1930s
and 1940s. Amusement parks of the era were typically crude and dirty and often rife with adult
themes and otherwise inappropriate atmospheres for children.12 Disney envisioned a “little
family park” that both adults and children could enjoy for a day.13 When Disneyland opened in
Anaheim, California, it was massively publicized and hosted by Art Linkletter, Bob Cummings,
and then television personality, Ronald Reagan.14 The park quickly became an enormous
commercial success. In a short time, the park achieved a tenfold return on its original investment
and was hosting guests from all over the world.15
Although Six Flags was clearly an attempt to replicate the theme park template that
Disneyland had become, it had a few key differences. Unlike Disneyland, which targets local
and out of state customers and is labeled as a “destination theme park,” Six Flags Over Texas
was specifically tailored to draw primarily local consumers.16 Because the park’s target market

10

Id.

11

Id.

Brian Bennett, A Brief History of the Disney Parks, MOUSE PLANET, http://
www.mouseplanet.com /dtp/archive/other/history.htm (last accessed Apr. 11, 2014).
12

13

Id.

The Grand Opening of Disneyland, DESIGNING DISNEY, http://www.designingdisney.com/
content/grand-opening-disneyland (last accessed Apr. 11, 2014).
14

About Walt Disney, Walt Disney Archives, https://d23.com/walt-disney-archives/aboutwaltdisney/ (last accessed Apr. 11, 2014).
15

Six Flags Timeline, SACRAMENTO STATE, http://www.csus.edu/indiv/s/shawg/articles/
facilities/six_flags_timeline.html (last accessed Apr. 11, 2014) (discussing Angus Wynne
“perhaps because he was clever or perhaps because he was
16
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was significantly smaller, there was a significant difference in cost between the two parks as
well. Disneyland cost nearly five times the amount of Six Flags at over $17 million, whereas Six
Flags Over Texas opened to the public at a cost of around $3 million.17 Furthermore, unlike
Disneyland’s year round operations, Six Flags operates seasonally and is considered a “regional
theme park” that uses its off season during the winter to add new attractions each year.18 Pricing
between the two parks was different as well. While Disneyland used a pay-as-you-go pricing
model, Six Flags went with a pay-one-price model to appeal to many families who liked
knowing in advance how much a day at the park would cost.19
The surprising economic success of Six Flags Over Texas prompted the company to
expand by opening another park in the southern United States. Six Flags Over Georgia opened
in Atlanta in 1967, making the company the first chain operator of theme parks. When Six Flags
Over Georgia proved to be another economic success, the company then opened Six Flags St.
Louis in Missouri. Through the next two decades and under multiple ownership changes, the
company pursued an impressive expansion program across the rest of the nation, eventually
opening or acquiring locations in the top ten designated market areas that serve approximately
100 million people and 160 million people within a radius of 50 miles and 100 miles,
respectively.20 From the company’s original single location in Texas, Six Flags has become the

Texas-arrogant, wanted his park to be for the people of Texas, not the entire country. He
wouldn't need nation-wide attendance to support his park, and he created the budget to
match. The concept also wasn't a universal one, but one that was very much Texas-bred.”).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 History, GUIDE TO SIX FLAGS OVER TEXAS, http://www.guidetosfot.com/parkinfo/history/
(last accessed Apr. 11, 2014).
20 Financial Reports, SIXFLAGS.COM, http://investors.sixflags.com/phoenix.zhtml?
c=61629&p=irol-reportsOther (last accessed Apr. 11, 2014).
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largest regional theme park operator in the world.21 The company now operates a total of 18
parks, with 16 parks within the domestic United States, one park in Mexico City, and one park in
Montreal.22 In the aggregate, the parks cover about 4,500 acres of real estate, with
approximately 800 rides, including over 120 roller coasters, making the park the leading provider
of “thrill rides” in the industry.23 The parks hosts nearly 50 million customers every year, and
employs nearly 35,000 people.24 The majority of people in North America live within an eighthour drive of at least one of the parks.25
B.

An Era of Expansions and Acquisitions

Although Angus Wynne was at the company’s helm during the park’s initial expansion
into Atlanta and St. Louis, he sold the park to a limited partnership after just a few years. By
1971, the park was sold to a railroad company, Penn Central Corporation, which had itself filed
bankruptcy the year before, and had bought the park in an attempt to diversify its income
streams.26 After several more ownership changes, the company was eventually acquired by
Time Warner in 1993.27 The Time Warner management team brought considerable changes to
the park including the use of Warner Bros. character themes and attractions throughout the park

21

Six Flags, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Dec. 31, 2012).

Overview, SIXFLAGS.COM, http://investors.sixflags.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=61629&p=irolIRHome (last accessed Apr. 24, 2014).
22

23

Six Flags, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Dec. 31, 2012).

About Six Flags, SIXFLAGSJOBS.COM, http://www.sixflagsjobs.com/dynamicparkpage.php (last
accessed, Apr. 11, 2014).
24

25

Id.

Brian Trumbore, The Collapse of Penn Central, BUYANDSELL.COM, http://
www.buyandhold.com/bh/en/education/history/2001/the_collapse_of_penn_central.html (last
accessed Apr. 11, 2014); Penn Central Transportation Company, HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL,
http://www.library.hbs.edu/hc/lehman/company.html? company=penn_central_transportation_co
mpany (last accessed Apr. 11, 2014).

26

History, GUIDE TO SIX FLAGS OVER TEXAS, http://www.guidetosfot.com/parkinfo/history/ (last
accessed Apr. 11, 2014)
27
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such as the Looney Tunes section for kids, and more recently the Gotham City section of the
park.28 In 1998, the park’s current owner, Premier Parks bought the company for $1.86 billion,
but maintained the use of the Warner Bros. themes and characters through licensing
agreements.29 Kieran Burke became the CEO in 1994 when the company changed its name from
Tierco to Premier Parks.30 The name change was made in part to brand the company as a
“premier” regional theme park operator.31 Under Burke’s leadership, the company began a new
era in its operations as it aggressively expanded with the acquisition of multiple park properties,
including international locations as well.32
Before Premier Parks acquired the company, it had successfully undertaken a strategic
plan to purchase amusement parks across the United States and upon purchase of Six Flags
Theme Parks quickly began to transform several of the previously acquired parks into Six Flags
sites.33 Through the 1990’s and early 2000’s the Oklahoma-based real estate company acquired
over twenty parks including locations in Mexico, Germany, Holland, Canada, and Belgium.34
Kieran E. Burke had been hired as president and CEO of Premier Parks in 1989, and was
responsible for the company’s shift from real estate to theme parks.35 By the mid 2000’s Six
Flags had built up a serious amount of debt as a result of the previous expansion, and began to
sell off some of their parks in an attempt to offset this debt.36 In 2005, it was reported that the
28

Id.

29

Id.

Premier Parks, Inc. History, FUNDING UNIVERSE, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/
companyhistories/premier-parks-inc-history/ (last accessed Apr. 11, 2014).
30

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id. (Premier Parks was originally Tierco Group, Inc.)

35

Id.

The Roots of Six Flags Entertainment Corp., WORDPRESS.COM (Feb. 10, 2011), http://
thekidleahey.wordpress.com/2011/02/10/the-roots-of-six-flags-entertainment-corp/.

36
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company was in over $2 billion of debt, and was facing criticism by many including the former
president of Six Flags, Ned DeWitt.37 DeWitt stated that the string of acquisitions didn’t make
sense, characterizing the purchases as “mania” and part of “crazed acquisition process” making
the company owners of multiple properties “they just couldn’t bring value to.”38
When Daniel Snyder became interested in purchasing Six Flags, he was well known as
the young billionaire owner of the Washington Redskins. Often disparagingly portrayed in the
media, he has been called “prickly” and “imperious” due to his demanding personality.39
Snyder’s interest in the company was in part due to Six Flag’s highly leveraged status; the
company had continued to plunge more deeply into debt and the current owners were looking for
a purchaser. Along with over a decade of overambitious acquisitions the company was also
suffering from the after-effects of the September 11 terrorist attacks, which had effected a
significant downturn in the theme park industry.40 Analysts also attributed the declines in Six
Flags attendance to sloppy operational management at some parks, opining that previous
overexpansion resulted in less attention to detail at some locations as well as acquisitions of
several generally weak amusement park properties.41 CEO Kieran Burke fielded such comments
by pointing to the overall strong performance of the parks during the first half of 2005 and
attributing such performance to new attractions, improved services, and an advertising campaign
featuring “Mr. Six” a geriatric character who danced to the late-90’s dance song “We Like to
Six Flags Faces Buying Spree Hangover, NEWS12 (Sep. 19, 2005), http://www.kxii.com/
home/headlines/1724681.html (reporting that DeWitt was Six Flags president from 1973 to
1982).
37

38

Id.

Anthony, Brown, Redeeming Daniel Snyder’s Rep, REDSKINSHOGHEAVEN.COM (Sep. 25,
2010).

39

Six Flags Faces Buying Spree Hangover, NEWS12 (Sep. 19, 2005), http://www.kxii.com/
home/headlines/1724681.html (reporting that the downturn began to show signs of reversing in
late 2005).
40

41

Id.

Restructuring a Theme Park: The Six Flags Bankruptcy

10

Party” and who had become a popular advertising character.42
II.

A Proxy Takeover
A.

Key Players

At the time Daniel Snyder began positioning himself to take control of Six Flags he was
not only well known as the owner of the Washington Redskins, he was also becoming a
considerably polarizing figure to many of the team’s fans. Snyder had purchased the Redskins in
1999 when the franchise had gross revenues of $162 million. By 2005, media reported that this
number had nearly doubled under Snyder’s leadership, and the company’s SEC filings reported
$300 million in gross revenues. Portrayed by many as brash, cocky, and arrogant, Snyder was
the owner of a marketing firm and worth an estimated $500 million at the time he made his bid
to purchase the Redskins.43 He had no experience managing a sports team. However, despite
the fact that the Redskins floundered on the field during Snyder’s tenure as owner, the franchise
had continued to rapidly increase in value.44 In fact, the franchise’s most recent SEC filing
showed revenues have grown to $381 million, with a team value of $1.7 billion.45 One
commentator noted the Redskins’ increase in value might lead one to believe that “if not a
football genius, [Snyder was] at least a capable businessman.”46 Snyder certainly seemed to

Id. (paraphrasing Burke, “the better recent performance reflects an investment program that
has added new attractions in many parks, initiatives to improve services to guests and an
advertising campaign featuring ‘Mr. Six,’ a dancing elderly man in a tuxedo.”).
42

Harry Jaffe, The Dan Snyder You Don’t Know, WASHINGTONIAN (Sept. 1, 2006),
http://www.washingtonian.com/articles/people/sports/the-dan-snyder-you-dont-know/.
43

Mike Jones, Redskins Rank Third On Forbes’ List of Most Valuable NFL Franchises, THE
WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/football-insider/
wp/2013/08/14/redskins-rank-third-on-forbes-list-of-most-valuable-nfl-franchises/.

44

Jeff Clabaugh, Redskins Team Value Rises to $1.7 Billion, WASHINGTON BUSINESS JOURNAL
(Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.bizjournals.com/washington/news/2013/08/14/redskins-team-valuerises-to-17.html.

45

Dave McKenna, Downward Spiral, SLATE MAGAZINE (May 3, 2010), http://www.slate.com/
articles/sports/sports_nut/2010/05/downward_spiral.html.
46
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believe his tenure as owner of the football franchise made him well-equipped to manage a theme
park, characterizing his team ownership as proving his “track record of success in venue-based
entertainment.”47 During Snyder’s takeover campaign, he referred to himself as a “proven
creator of value” who was qualified to lead the management team of Six Flags due to his ability
to increase revenues and facilitate stock price appreciation.48
Along with installing himself as the new chairman of Six Flags’ board of directors,
Snyder also wanted to make his good friend, Mark Shapiro, CEO of the company.49 Shapiro,
who had left a prestigious job as an executive at ESPN, was immediately lauded as a “former
ESPN programming whiz,” who would help reinvigorate the struggling theme park.50 Shapiro
threw his not insignificant support behind Snyder’s takeover efforts in late 2005.51 The duo then
began a sizeable campaign to gain the support of Six Flags investors to market their plan to take
control of the company, and chartered a jet to fly them across the country to sell their idea to
company investors who held large percentages of stock.52 Their efforts were rewarded when
New York investor, Simon Glick, who owned nearly ten percent of the company, stated his
intentions to vote in favor of Snyder’s proposal.53 They were eventually able to attract the

47

Six Flags, Consent Solicitation (Schedule 14A), at 15 (Oct. 2005).

48

Six Flags, Consent Solicitation (Schedule 14A), at 17 (Oct. 2005).

Jaffe, supra note 43 (reporting that Snyder first took notice of Shapiro in 2003, who was a
rising star at ESPN at the time. The two were friends first and took family vacations together
before Snyder actually asked Shapiro whether he would ever be interested in running Six Flags).

49

Mark Hyman, The Batman and Robin of Six Flags, BUSINESSWEEK, (May 7, 2006), http://
www.businessweek.com/stories/2006-05-07/the-batman-and-robin-of-six-flags.
50

Annys Shin, Major Six Flags Holder Backs Snyder Takeover, THE WASHINGTON POST (Nov.
3, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/02/
AR2005110202774.html.

51

52

Id.

Id. (reporting Snyder’s takeover bid “For his gambit to succeed, Snyder, Six Flags' largest
shareholder, with a stake of about 11.7 percent, needs owners of a majority of company shares to
support him. More than 70 percent of Six Flags' shares are controlled by seven investors. In
addition to Snyder and Glick, other major investors include Omaha fund manager Wallace

53
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support of other heavyweight investors, most notably Bill Gate’s Cascade Investment. They
received an additional boost from a report by the nation’s largest shareholder-advisory firm,
Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”), which recommended that shareholders vote to replace
the current directors with Snyder and his proposed team.54
Shapiro had been with ESPN for 12 years when he joined Snyder’s efforts to take over
Six Flags.55 He was vocal about both his passion for the Six Flags venture as well as his
personal high regard for Snyder and his confidence in Snyder’s capacity as a strategic
businessman.56 In response to speculation that Snyder had offered him a financial windfall to
leave ESPN, with as much as $10 million in guaranteed salary and bonuses, Shapiro answered
that he felt that Six Flags was an ideal job opportunity, stating “I would never, ever leave what I
view as one of the best jobs in America, unless . . . [t]he subject matter . . . [is] something I’m
passionate about.”57 On his opinion of Snyder, who was tactfully referred to as an “independent
thinker, and not easy to work for,” Shapiro stated that Snyder was a family man who was also
loyal, honest, and a winner who “has made people a lot of money.”58

Weitz, who controls about 10.6 percent of the shares, and Microsoft founder Bill Gates, who
owns about 11.5 percent.”).
Id.; Dean Starkman, Investor Adviser Backs Snyder on Six Flags, THE WASHINGTON POST
(Nov. 16, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/15/
AR2005111501592.html.

54

Online Extra: Why Mark Shapiro Left ESPN, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Oct. 16, 2005)
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2005-10-16/online-extra-why-mark-shapiro-left-espn.
55

56

Id.

Id. (Quoting Shapiro “If somebody said to me tomorrow: ‘You can run a bottled-water
company, and we'll give you $20 million up front,’ I wouldn't do it. I've got to love what I'm
doing. I'm not leaving from ESPN. I'm leaving to go somewhere. There's a big difference.”).

57

Id. (Quoting Shapiro on Snyder “There's what you read and what you get. I'm not going to
say everything you read, there's no truth to it. I've been with him. Our wives know each other.
He's a family man, which I love. Great children. I have met his mom. She is salt of the earth.
And his best friend in life is his dad… Anyone who puts so much stock in his family can't be
half-bad. Beyond that, he is extremely loyal to anyone he works with or who works for him. He
has
58
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Snyder wanted to give a director seat to another longtime personal friend, Dwight Schar.
Schar was the founder of NVR, Inc., a fortune 500 company that is reported as being the sixth
leading home builder in the United States, and third in terms of revenue.59 Schar was also well
known for his significant philanthropic endeavors and heavy participation in Republican politics,
an interest that he shared with Snyder.60 Originally a high school teacher, Schar’s first
experience in the home building industry was selling homes on the weekends.61 He eventually
founded NVHomes in 1980, which he later renamed NVR after acquiring his former employer,
Ryan Homes in 1987.62 Like Shapiro, Schar was intensely loyal to Snyder despite criticism of
his management style and had had a business relationship with him since Snyder had approached
him about becoming part owner of the Redskins.63 Snyder didn’t need cash at that time, but he
wanted to pay down the team’s debt burden.64 Schar took advantage of the opportunity and
bought a 15-percent interest in the team for $200 million in 2003.65 Tapping the talents of Mark
Shapiro and Dwight Schar, and touting them as his handpicked management team, Snyder was
made people a lot of money. He's a winner. And he wears his emotions on his sleeve. If you
don't like everything he says, at least he's not lying to you. I admire that.”).
Dick Clark Productions Acquired by Redzone Capital, BUSINESSWIRE.COM (Jun. 19, 2007),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20070619005639/en/dick-clark-productionsAcquired-Redzone-Capital#.Uy8-eShq5UQ; Gretchen Morgenson, Who Benefits From This
Buyback, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Jun. 3, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/03/business/
yourmoney/03gret.html?ref=nvrinc&_r=0. (NVR is the 10th largest seller of residential housing
in the United States).

59

Billionaire Profile: Dwight Schar, MONEYEDUP (Oct. 14, 2011), http://
www.moneyedup.com/2011/10/billionaire-profile-dwight-schar/ (discussing Schar who was one
of President Bush’s largest fundraisers during his re-election campaign, and also held a position
on the Bush inaugural committee).
60

61

Id.

62

Id.

Jaffe, supra note 43, (Discussing Snyder’s relationship with Schar “In the spring of 2003, Dan
Snyder invited Dwight Schar to lunch at the Capital Grill on Pennsylvania Avenue. ‘I have a list
of 100 people I would consider selling part of the Redskins to,’ he said. ‘You are in the top
three.’”).
63

64

Id.

65

Id.
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able to successfully sell his idea to many of the company’s shareholders. In addition to ISS’s
overwhelmingly positive report on Snyder’s takeover intentions, another positive review came
from Glen Reid, a Bear Stearns analyst, who stated that Snyder’s shareholder activism was “one
potential bright light for Six Flags.”66 While other analysts blamed debt as the reason for the
company’s problems, Reid credited slowed spending such as the company’s halted purchases of
normally lucrative investments like new rides as the reason for the problems, “[i]n order to
maintain high attendance rates, you have to spend money.”67 Spending money to make money
was something Snyder had proven himself to be immensely good at while managing the
Redskins. That he understood the particular importance of spending money on marketing was
well known to people familiar with the industry. According to Robert Johnson, owner of the
Charlotte Bobcats basketball team, “If there is an asset that is under-marketed and [Snyder]
thinks he can do it better, there is gold in them there hills for him.”68
B.

Convincing the Shareholders

When Snyder began to aggressively pursue control of the company he filed a proposal
with the SEC under his limited liability company, Red Zone, that detailed his strategy. “It’s time
for a change” was the central theme of the filing.69 He argued that the company needed to
conduct a purge of properties that weren’t critical to the management plan and also overhaul the
company’s advertising and marketing strategies to establish a “clean, safe and fun” image for the

Bill Burbaker, For Snyder, The Six Flags Thrill Is Gone, THE WASHINGTON POST (Feb.
25,2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A51931-2005Feb24_3.html.

66

Michael Barbaro, Gates, Snyder Interested in Change at Six Flags, THE WASHINGTON POST
(Sept. 1, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A50718-2004Aug31_2.html.
67

68

Id.

69

Six Flags, Consent Solicitation (Schedule 14A), at 5 (Oct. 2005).
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company.70 Snyder contended that under the then-current management team, the company was
experiencing a loss of shareholder value in the billions of dollars.71 He stated that the company
had recorded negative earnings from 2000 to 2005 and that management had responded poorly
by citing weather as the source of the decreasing crowds.72 Throughout the proposal, Snyder
compared Six Flags to the park’s closest competitor, Cedar Fair, noting that Cedar Fair had
consistently outperformed Six Flags for the past five years as reflected by a comparison of their
indexed stock prices.73
According to Snyder, Cedar Fair guests spent an average of $5.50 more per visit than the
typical Six Flags guest.74 He speculated that if Six Flags could accomplish the same, the
company would generate $200 million in incremental revenue and approximately $1 billion in
shareholder revenue.75 In support of his argument that the park was in serious need of an image
overhaul to successfully appeal to families, particularly those with young children, Snyder then
cited media reports of several fights that had recently broken out in two of the parks.76
According to Snyder, the Six Flags brand was being seriously damaged as a result of such
occurrences.77 He also believed the company had been “burning cash” for years and was overconcerned about reducing its debt burden, while management had rewarded itself with overSix Flags Faces Buying Spree Hangover, NEWS12 (Sep. 19, 2005), http://www.kxii.com/
home/headlines/1724681.html.

70

Six Flags, Consent Solicitation (Schedule 14A), at 5 (Oct. 2005) (Snyder based this number on
previous share counts of Six Flags’ public filings).
71
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Id. at 7.

Id. at 6 (stating that from 2000 to 2005, Cedar Fair saw consistent gains in stock prices going
from right around 100.0 to 164.0, while Six Flags went from over 100.0 to under 39.6).
73

74

Id. at 8.

Id. at 8 (predicting that if Six Flags could achieve the same per cap spending as Cedar Fair it
would add approximately $1 billion in shareholder value).
75

Six Flags, Consent Solicitation (Schedule 14A), at 10 (Oct. 2005) (reporting that the fights
cited in the presentation occurred in the summer of 2005 at Six Flags Astro World in Houston,
TX, and Six Flags Magic Mountain in Valencia, CA.).
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generous compensation packages.78 In particular, he noted that during the previous year, CEO
Burke and CFO Dannhauser had received stock options not tied to company performance; grants
that equaled 80 percent of the total stock options granted to the company.79
The proposed management team included Snyder himself, Mark Shapiro, and Dwight
Schar. These “new and passionate leaders” were committed to reinvigorating Six Flags, which
was characterized as a company that “lacks any sense of passion, pride, and enthusiasm.”80
Snyder’s new management team would undertake an operating plan and capital management
strategy that would vastly improve the company’s ailing bottom line by increasing attendance
and revenue, decreasing expenses, and ultimately maximizing shareholder value.81
The new team’s strategy began with seeking stockholder consent for the takeover, and the
ousting of key members of the current board, including Kieran Burke, James Dannhauser, and
Stanley Schuman, who were respectively the company’s CEO, CFO, and Director.82 As the
managing partner of the largest shareholder of Six Flags, Snyder and his proposed management
team owned 11.7% of the company’s stock.83 The suggested strategy for the proxy takeover also
contained a timeline of relevant events, including the initial Schedule 13D filed in August of
2004 when Red Zone purchased over 8 million shares of Six Flags, bringing the entity’s
ownership to over 5%, which is the threshold amount required for the mandatory Schedule 13D

Id. at 12 (stating that Burke and Dannhauser received stock and grants not tied to company
performance and they received 80% of the stock options granted to the company).

78
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Id.
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Id. at 17.
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Id. at 15.

Id. at 20 (proposing an amendment to the company’s bylaws to accomplish several things,
including the following: limit the number of directors on the board to seven, require that the
vacancies on the board be filled only by stockholder majority vote, and repeal every provision of
the company’s bylaws or amendments adopted after September 13, 2004.).
82

Proxy Adviser Backs Six Flags Takeover, DALLAS BUSINESS JOURNAL (Nov. 15, 2005), http://
www.bizjournals.com/dallas/stories/2005/11/14/daily16.html
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filing.84 The timeline also reflected Six Flag’s then-current management team’s unsatisfactory
response to Snyder’s repeated efforts to engage in constructive talks for improving company
operations.85 In Snyder’s Schedule 13D filing he attached a copy of a letter he had written to the
Six Flags Board of Directors which described his rebuffed efforts to participate in decisionmaking with the company:
“Since current management of the Company apparently feels its time is better
spent speaking with attorneys rather than exploring ways to improve shareholder
value, I am writing to request a meeting with the non-officer outside directors of
the Company's Board of Directors. I am very concerned about the consistently
disappointing performance of the Company. This must be addressed immediately
- shareholders should not have to suffer through one more period of poor financial
performance or one more announcement that the Company will miss its expected
numbers.”86
Unsurprisingly Six Flags had strong criticism for Snyder’s ideas, arguing that his plans would
undermine the sales process and ultimately lessen shareholder value.87 CEO Kieran Burke sent a
letter to shareholders communicating his disapproval of Snyder’s plans describing Snyder and
his selected management team as “people with no experience in the theme-park industry [that]
would be in a position to implement so-called ideas that we think are dangerous and potentially
destructive of shareholder value.”88
Undeterred, Snyder continued to pursue his takeover bid, arguing that specific changes
were needed in order to maximize shareholder value. In proxy disclosures, he identified a
Six Flags, Consent Statement (Schedule 13D), at 2 (Sep. 2, 2004). (Red Zone’s purchase of
8,150,000 shares of Six Flags stock equaled 8.8% ownership of the company).
84

Six Flags, Consent Solicitation (Schedule 14A), at 20 (Oct. 2005). (stating “the Company
ignored our suggestions and failed to implement any alternative strategies that would deliver
acceptable results for shareholders,” and “[t]he Independent Directors made it clear that they
would not entertain any of Mr. Snyder’s suggestions.”).
85
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Six Flags, Consent Statement (Schedule 13D), at 4 (Sep. 2, 2004).

Paul Monies, Large Shareholder Files Against Six Flags Sale NFL Redskins’ Owner Backed
By Major Investor, NEWSOK (Nov. 3, 2005), http://newsok.com/large-shareholder-filesagainstsix-flags-salebrnfl-redskins-owner-backed-by-major-investor/article/2918261.
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handful of areas that needed improvement, including advertising and marketing, concessions,
sponsorships, and merchandise. Advertising and marketing could be better focused towards
families with young children as well as teenagers.89 This was opposed to the company’s current
advertising strategy which he characterized as targeted only at teenagers and Generation X.90
Regarding improvements to concessions, Snyder argued that outsourcing was necessary and that
selling rights to the park’s key food items would allow name brand consumer foods companies to
benefit from the strategic relationship.91 By engaging in sponsorship partnerships, Six Flags
could collect fees from third parties in exchange for providing lucrative marketing opportunities
within the parks.92 Similarly, park merchandise could benefit from co-branding as well. Snyder
envisioned co-branding opportunities that would include partnerships in a broad array of areas
such as action sports, video games, music, movies, and more.93
Staying true to his reputation for boosting the bottom-line by aggressively raising prices
on incremental revenue streams, Snyder planned to increase parking fees, and allow groups to
rent the parks and parking lots for special events.94 He also intended to create tiered pricing for
package deals, develop a loyalty program, and eliminate any unnecessary discounts, which had
89

Six Flags, Consent Solicitation (Schedule 14A), at 24 (Oct. 2005).

Id. (Snyder argued that current Six Flags advertising had no clear message and used an overly
expensive advertising campaign).
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Id.

Id. (Characterizing the current sponsorship relationships as using “tired and dated brands that
generate little recognition by children.”).
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Six Flags, Consent Statement (Schedule 14A), at 24 (Oct, 2005). (Arguing that the company’s
current merchandise offerings suffered from “tired and dated brands that generate little
recognition among children.”).
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McKenna, supra note 46, (reporting “Snyder's run atop Six Flags was a debacle from the start.
His shtick was much the same as he'd used with the Redskins, where he put a price tag on
anything without one (charging admission to training camp) or added a bigger number to
everything with one (quadrupling parking fees in a decade)… Just as he'd done at FedEx Field
(which was called Jack Kent Cooke Stadium before Snyder sold the naming rights for $7.6
million per year through 2025), Snyder inflated the parking rates at Six Flags lots all over the
country.”).
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been previously characterized as cheapening the whole experience.95 Highlighting Dwight
Schar’s real estate expertise, the shareholder proposal stated that excess acreage owned by Six
Flags could be re-zoned, revalued, and sold to third parties to help reduce the company’s debt
and save on property taxes.96 Snyder closed the proposal by requesting shareholder support and
stating that his team was unable to block a sale of the company since they were a minority on the
board, but as majority owners they would vote in favor of any transaction that would offer the
highest value to shareholders.97
Snyder’s plan attracted the support of many, including former Six Flags president, Ned
DeWitt, who was quoted as responding to Snyder’s SEC filing, “I haven’t ever met Dan Snyder
… but it sounds like he’s dead on.” Dennis Speigel, president of International Theme Park
Services, attributed the park’s declines to “flawed business plans” such as overly discounted
ticket prices, and management decisions made in desperation.98 One analyst is quoted as stating
that then-current CEO, Kieran Burke, was seen more as a politician than an operating CEO who
was willing to get involved in the details of running the parks.99 In a passionate letter entitled

McKenna, supra note 46; Six Flags Faces Buying Spree Hangover, EAST VALLEY TRIBUNE
(Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.eastvalleytribune.com/money/article_084b70a7-9e3d-5530b255-85f88d8a34ad.html?mode=jqm (paraphrasing Six Flag’s former president, Ned DeWitt,
who stated that the company offered too many discount admission schemes that reduce revenue
from entry fees forcing the company to attempt to recoup those losses through the sale of other
in-park merchandise).

95
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Six Flags, Consent Statement (Schedule 14A), at 24 (Oct, 2005).
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Id. at 34 (stating that Six Flags’ sale announcement was “merely a defensive tactic.”).

Id. at 13 (quoting Dennis Speigel “They’ve had flawed business plans. They prostituted the
front gate, and put so many discounts out in the marketplace that that’s only way the consumer
is going to come. Why pay $44 when you could bring in a Coke can or a McDonald’s wrapper
and get in for $5? The more you discount, it’s like a junkie shooting up heroin – the more you
shoot it, the more you need it. They began doing things in desperation to build the business, but
what they were really doing was strangling their business.”).
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Id. at 13 (quoting David Miller, “The problem with Kieran Burke is that he’s perceived as a
politician, and that he’s not perceived as an operating CEO. He’s not seen on the Street as a
rollup-your-sleeves-and-run-these-parks kind of guy.”).
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“What is Dan Snyder So Afraid Of and Why is He Trying to Rush You into Voting,” Burke
urged shareholders to reject Snyder’s proposals, and described the takeover bid as an attempt to
prevent shareholders from obtaining their fair share of value through a sale of the company:
In our view, the last thing [Snyder] wants to see is a successful sale of Six Flags.
We believe he wants our sale process to fail so that he can take effective control
of Six Flags without paying full value for all of your shares. We think that if
Snyder wants control of Six Flags, he should pay stockholders for it! … In our
judgment, Snyder’s attempts to sling mud at our directors and management and
denigrate the sale process are simply a tactic to divert stockholders from focusing
on what’s important. Don’t be rushed by Snyder into giving your consent before
you have the opportunity to evaluate all of your alternatives!100
In response to Snyder’s shareholder proposal, Six Flags filed a counter-proposal that
touted their undergoing attempts to sell the company as “maximizing value for all
stockholders” that was “designed to attract the best possible transaction for ALL
stockholders and provide full and fair value for ALL Six Flags shares.”101 The
recommendation statement also attempted to reassure shareholders that the current
strategic plan was working and the company was continuing to grow under current
management, “[the company has] significantly outperformed our peers in 2005 and have
set the stage for substantial future growth.”102 Directly responding to Snyder’s proposal,
Six Flags pronounced the plans as “neither original nor creative” that would “put your
investment at risk,” and “demonstrate a significant lack of understanding of and
experience in the theme park business.”103 In particular, the counter-proposal stated that
Snyder’s plans to engage in strategic vendor relationships for concessions and

Six Flags Sends Letter to Stockholders; Urges Stockholders to Preserve Their Choices by
Rejecting Red Zone's Consent, SIX FLAGS FOR INVESTORS (Nov. 11, 2005), http://
phx.corporateir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=61629&p=irol-newsArticle_pf&ID=781873&highlight=.
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Six Flags, Solicitation/Recommendation Statement, (Schedule 14D-9), at 3 (Nov. 2, 2005).
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merchandise was “[c]ontracting away highly profitable concession business,” and
abandoning the “key teen demographic, which represents 30% of attendance (10
million).”104 Wisely alluding to the difference in customers between industries, the filing
noted that theme park guests would react less elastically to changing pricing and discount
strategies than football fans of a monopoly NFL team.105
In spite of Burke’s best attempts to characterize Snyder’s plans as “misguided” and
“backwards,” Snyder’s proposal had successfully captured the support of many of the company’s
shareholders.106 Consequently, on November 22, 2005, Snyder released a press statement stating
that 57 percent of Six Flags’ shareholders had voted to support his consent solicitation.107
Revealing the highly contentious nature of the takeover, Six Flags quickly responded that the
vote was subject to verification, and called for an independent audit of the vote.108 After IVS
Associates Inc., (a leading inspector of corporate elections), certified that more than 57 percent
of votes cast were for Red Zone, Six Flags finally released a short statement conceding Snyder’s
win, “[the] Board of Directors has unanimously appointed Mr. Daniel M. Snyder as nonexecutive Chairman of the Board of Directors.” All of the proposals contained in the consent
solicitation were adopted, including the amendments to the company’s by-laws.109 Red Zone

104

Id.

Id. at 27, (stating “[p]ro sports franchise reflects monopoly in local market with die-hard fan
base” that has “[s]old out every home game since 1966 regardless of weather, economy or team
performance.”)
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Six Flags Sends Letter to Stockholders; Urges Stockholders to Preserve Their Choices by
Rejecting Red Zone's Consent, SIX FLAGS FOR INVESTORS (Nov. 11, 2005), http://phx.corporateir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=61629&p=irol-newsArticle_pf&ID=781873&highlight=.
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Redskins Owner Gains Six Flags Board Seats, ATLANTA BUSINESS CHRONICLE (Nov. 29,
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to verification).
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released a separate statement proudly announcing “[t]he shareholders have spoken—and we
would like to thank all of them for this vote of confidence.”110
III.

PRE-BANKRUPTCY
A.

Old Tactics and A New Venture

As expected, there were some parallels regarding Snyder’s management of the Redskins
and his management of Six Flags. Throughout his management of the Redskins although Snyder
was unable to facilitate actual wins on the football field, he had become adept at getting the team
to deliver incredible profits.111 According to some commentators, Snyder’s substantial profitmaking ability was the result of “gouging fans at every opportunity and placing sponsored ads on
anything that moves—even other ads.”112 During his run as the Redskin’s owner, his penchant
for aggressive price increasing coupled with the team’s lack of wins caused significant criticism
from fans concerning what many considered a failure to produce a quality product—that of a
winning football team.113 One of Redskin fans’ most disliked moves was Snyder’s decision to
charge admission for training camp workouts.114 Snyder later conceded that this decision was a
mistake, reflecting that it was a “dumb move.”115 But the damage had already been done; he’d
alienated many Redskins fans, and solidified a public perception of himself as not much more

Six Flags Admits Defeat In Takeover Fight, UPI (Nov. 29, 2005), http://www.upi.com/
Business_News/2005/11/29/Six-Flags-admits-defeat-in-takeover-fight/UPI-95811133282001/.
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than a greedy businessman whose only concern was continually increasing profits.116
In many ways Snyder’s management of Six Flags was similar to his management of the
Redskins. He immediately raised prices on admission, concessions, and parking.117 The high
parking prices stimulated nearby businesses to offer parking in their own lots allowing Six Flags
customers to save money by walking to the park.118 Snyder then went to local authorities and
through heavy lobbying accomplished a ban on off-site parking practices citing a concern for
pedestrian safety.119 The parking ordinance was passed despite the fact that no injuries or
accidents had been reported in the past two decades that the private lots had been in existence.120
Snyder had previously used the exact same pedestrian safety argument when attempting to keep
Redskins fans from taking advantage of off-site parking options in the vicinity of the
FedExField.121
To his credit, Snyder did more than raise prices in attempts to increase the parks’
profitability. True to plans revealed in his proxy disclosures, Snyder also increased character
presence in the parks, using characters like Thomas the Tank Engine and Bugs Bunny to better
appeal to families.122 The company also began strategic partnerships with recognizable food

Id. (reporting Snyder’s decision to charge admission for training camp “In 2003 Snyder
moved training camp from Carlisle, Pennsylvania, to Redskins Park in Loudoun County.
[Snyder] opened it to fans. He charged admission. And a parking fee. ’That was another
mistake,’ he says. ‘Charging fans to see training camp. Dumb move.’”).
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vendors like Papa Johns, Johnny Rockets, Cold Stone Creamery, and Heinz.123 Heinz, in
particular, accomplished an impressive duel marketing campaign in return for being the “Official
Ketchup of Six Flags Theme Parks.”124 In attempts to facilitate a more family-friendly
atmosphere the company barred bikini tops and restricted smoking to small, designated areas on
the outskirts of park premises.125 While competitors were investing in expensive rides to lure
customers, Six Flags was doing the opposite and investing in more kiddie rides and modest roller
coasters in order to cut costs and attract families.126 The newly opened Dark Knight coaster at
the Six Flags location in New Jersey was much smaller than many of its competitors and was
encased in a dark building that effectively disguised its size; it was also comparatively low-cost
compared to its competitors.127
B.

Customer Perception, and Shareholder Response

Despite the significant increase in average in-park spending per customer, park guests
were less than impressed as reflected by attendance numbers that continued to decrease under
Snyder’s management.128 By early 2008, the company’s stock had lost three quarters of its
value.129 Stock prices fell even more when media reported that the company was attempting to
obtain liquor licenses for Six Flags Over Texas and Hurricane Harbor, both located in

William Spain, Raft of New Licensing, Sponsor Deals For Six Flags, MARKET WATCH (Dec.
12, 2006), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/raft-of-new-licensing-sponsorship-deals-forsixflags.
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Jeffrey McCracken, No Fun For Six Flags As Parks Face Slump—As Debt Looms, Smaller
Coasters Are In, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Aug. 5, 2008).
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Jeremiah McWilliams, Six Flags Tries to Ride It Out, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 23,
2008), http://www.leisure-business.com/stl-post-dispatch1.html. (reporting that “[a]verage guest
spending grew 13 percent to about $39 in the first quarter.”).
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Arlington.130 To many people, this decision appeared directly at odds with Snyder’s initial
pledge to stockholders that he would focus on mothers with young children as well as youth.131
Media also reported that Six Flags Discovery Kingdom located in California had been named the
worst park for elephants in the entire country, and had been the subject of concern by an animal
rights group who requested an investigation by the federal government.132 The company took
another hit when an incident of a much more tragic nature occurred when a 14-year old girl’s
feet were severed on the Superman free-fall ride at the company’s Kentucky park.133 Further bad
publicity occurred when a teenage boy was struck and killed by a roller coaster after he had
climbed a protective fence.134
Six Flags’ shares first began to tumble in mid 2006, relatively shortly after the proxy
takeover. During 2006, the company lost $275 million, and the following year lost $328
million.135 One of the most significant decreases in share value occurred the day after Shapiro
had made a particularly disconcerting announcement via conference call that the company no
longer expected to meet its earnings projections and that revenue and attendance had
decreased.136 The company announced that its debt burden was becoming difficult to manage
and that the leadership team was contemplating selling six of its theme parks, including one of its
leading properties, the Magic Mountain park in California.137
To their credit, the new management team had followed through with many of the
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strategic plans that Snyder had detailed in his consent solicitation the year before. As a result,
the company had seen a positive increase in average spending per guest, but had experienced a
decrease in sales of season passes.138 The price of season passes had been raised in an attempt to
attract higher-paying visitors and families as opposed to teenagers.139 This decrease offset any
gains that the company had hoped to see from higher spending per visitor. In addition, rumors
that the company was considering selling their flagship park, Magic Mountain, was a shocking
development for shareholders because it was one of the company’s most valuable locations.140
Shapiro validated these rumors when he made an announcement to this effect, and although sale
proceedings were never initiated the statement probably served to further weaken investors’
perceptions about the company’s economic stability.
In an interview a few months before Six Flags’ shares took a major hit in June of 2006,
Shapiro communicated plans for the company to branch out with a more diverse entertainment
package. He felt that the company had focused too narrowly on just thrill rides, which he
acknowledged were important but in his opinion not enough.141 However, he wanted the park to
have a more diverse entertainment options such as parades, fireworks, concerts, and celebrity
appearances.142 Again, the management team was nearly single-mindedly focused on restoring a
family atmosphere at the parks, a focus that produced a subtle but noticeable aversion for their
previously popular demographic, teenagers. By raising prices on season passes, the company
had hoped to attract more families than teenage customers, but the tactic did not work as
138

Id.
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Id. (reporting that the company’s debt burden was at a troubling level and that management
was contemplating selling six of its theme parks, including the Magic Mountain park in
California).
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planned. There was some concern that by raising entrance and parking fees, the company had
priced itself out of some markets.143
Shapiro continued to insist that the company was making progress on its goal to deleverage itself and pointed to the recession as a potential positive for the company.144 Alluding
to the fact that theme parks are historically recession-resistant due to their appeal to local bluecollar families who often choose theme parks over more expensive trips during a down economy,
Shapiro vocalized his hope that the recession would increase revenues, “As parents elect to stay
closer to home, we want to give them a family-friendly offering that’s a better value… When the
economy tightens, I think we’re well-positioned.”145 In another interview, Shapiro theorized that
high gas prices might also help the company in the same way by enticing cash-strapped families
to take day trips closer to home, “It’s a working premise… But no one knows for sure. We’ve
never had $4-a-gallon gas. It’s obviously not the economic environment I would have
chosen.”146 The company’s plans to trim about $55 million in operational costs were worrying
for some analysts who accurately predicted that the economic downturn in 2008 had the potential
to hurt Six Flags more than previous downturns.147 Kit Spring, a Stifel Nicolaus analyst, stated
that if Six Flags cut its operations too deeply, customer satisfaction and revenue could drop.148
Despite reports that the company had seen an increase in revenues and had achieved a
sharp reduction in losses, Six Flags began contemplating ways to avoid a Chapter 11 filing by
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late 2008.149 In attempts to sidestep bankruptcy proceedings, Six Flags hired bankruptcy counsel
and financial advisors to assist with creditor negotiations and to help navigate its enormous debt
load.150 The company’s CFO, Jeff Speed, confirmed the hiring of Chicago law firm, Paul,
Hastings, Janofsky, and Walker, along with investment bank, Houlihan, Lokey, Howard, and
Zukin, stating “[o]ur creditors are very supportive, but obviously there are issues we need to
address… We are trying to accomplish something on a consensual basis… That is always
preferred, but I can't speculate on what the ultimate resolution will be.”151
IV.

CHAPTER ELEVEN
A.

Prepetition Indebtedness
a.

Prepetition Credit Agreement

In May 2007, the Debtors had entered into a Pre-Petition Credit Agreement which provided
for a $850 million term loan with a maturity date of April 2015, a revolving credit facility
totaling $275 million (as well as letters of credit with the approximate amount of $30,132,885),
and an uncommitted optional term loan tranche of up to $300 million.152 As of the date of filing,
approximately $835,125,000 of the term loan was outstanding, and approximately $270.6 million
of the revolving debt was outstanding.153 The Debtors was required to make quarterly principal
payments on the term loan in the amount of $2,125,000 until the date of maturity.154 The

Jeffrey McCracken, Six Flags Braces for a Dive, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Mar. 13, 2009)
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Debtors granted blanket security interests and mortgages on virtually all of their assets in order
to secure the obligations under the Pre-Petition Credit Agreement.155
b.

Derivative Financial Instruments

In February 2008, the Debtors entered into two Interest Swap Agreements that converted
$600 million of the term loan in the Pre-Petition Credit Agreement into a fixed rate obligation.156
Each Interest Swap agreement was for a $300 million amount.157 As of the date of filing, the
counterparties to the Interest Swap Agreement had claims against the Debtors in the amount of
$18.7 million.158
c.

Unsecured Notes

As of the date of filing, the Debtors owed $1.27 billion related to fixed-rate Senior
Unsecured Notes with various maturity dates and interest rates.159 There are five pools of
Unsecured Notes issued or guaranteed by the Debtors, including 2010 Notes, 2013 Notes, 2014
Notes, 2015 Notes, and 2016 Notes.160 Each of these Unsecured Notes was subordinate to the
obligations under the Prepetition Credit Agreement.161
i.

2010 Notes

In February 2002, Six Flag, Inc. (“SFI”) issued $480 million of 8 7/8% senior notes that
would mature in 2010.162 SFI later repurchased approximately $200 million of the 2010 Notes
and exchanged approximately $150 million of the notes for 2016 Notes.163 The 2010 Notes
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required annual interest payments of $11,633,000.164
ii.

2013 Notes

In April 2003, SFI issued $430 million of 9 ¾% senior notes that would mature in 2013.165
SFI subsequently repurchased $56 million of the 2013 Notes and exchanged $231,559,000 of the
2013 Notes for 2016 Notes.166 These notes required annual interest payments of $13,888,000.167
iii.

2014 Notes

In December 2003, SFI issued $325 million of 9 5/8% senior notes that would mature in
2014.168 In January 2005 SFI would issue an additional $195 million worth of 2014 Notes.169
SFI would late repurchase $55,350,000 of the 2014 Notes and exchange $149,863,000 of the
2014 Notes for 2016 Notes.170 These notes required annual interest payments of $30,298,000.171
iv.

2015 Notes

In November 2004, SFI issued $299 million of notes that would mature in 2015.172 The
notes would be convertible to SFI common stock at a rate of 157.4803 shares for every $1,000 of
2015 Notes.173 In 2007, SFI repurchased $19 million of the 2015 Notes.174 These notes required
an annual interest payment of $12.6 million.175
v.

2016 Notes

In June 2008, there was a private debt exchange in which the Debtors issued $400 million
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of 12 ¼% senior notes of Six Flags Operations Inc. due in 2016 which were exchanged for
$149,223,000 of the 2010 Notes, $231,559,000 of the 2013 Notes, and $149,263,000 of the 2014
Notes.176 The goal of the exchange was to reduce debt, extend maturities, and annual interest
expenses.177 The 2016 Notes required annual interest payments of $49 million.178
d.

Preferred Income Equity Redeemable Shares

In January 2001, the Debtors issued 11.5 million Preferred Income Equity Redeemable
Shares (“PIERS”), for a $277,834,000 amount.179 Each PIERS represents one one-hundredth
(1/100) interest in a share of Debtor’s 7.25% convertible preferred stock.180 Under the terms of
the PIERS, they were required to be redeemed on August 15, 2009 for cash at 100% of the
liquidation preference.181 This would have been approximately $287.5 million plus accrued
unpaid dividends in the amount of $31.3 million.182
e.

Time Warner and Guarantees of Partnership Parks Loan

When the Debtors acquired Six Flags from Time Warner in 1998, they guaranteed certain
obligations related to Six Flags Over Georgia and Six Flags Over Texas (together the
“Partnership Parks”).183 The obligations related to Six Flags Over Georgia would continue until
2027 and those related to Six Flags Over Texas would continue until 2028.184 These obligations
included minimum annual distributions to partners in the Partnership Parks, minimum capital
expenditures at each park during rolling 5-year periods based on 6% of each parks revenues, and
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an annual offer to purchase a maximum number of 5% per year of the limited partnership
units.185
When the Debtors acquired Six Flags in 1998, they also entered into a Subordinated
Indemnity Agreement with Time Warner, Inc. and certain Time Warner affiliates.186 Time
Warner guaranteed all the obligations that Debtors owe to the Partnership Parks, and under the
Subordinated Indemnity Agreement, Time Warner would receive record title to any entity that
had or would later purchase any limited partnership units of the Partnership Parks.187 In
addition, the Debtors were required to deposit a calculated sum into escrow as a potential source
of capital in the event that Time Warner had to fulfill its guarantee of the obligations to
Partnership Parks.188 In the event of default of the Subordinated Indemnity Agreement, Time
Warner would take control of the entities that own the limited partnership units and Debtors’
licensing agreement would terminate.189
B.

Key Events Leading to Chapter 11

The Debtors faced challenges for years before filing Chapter 11. These challenges, most
notably market conditions and an over-leveraged balance sheet, made it extremely difficult to
achieve profitability. The Debtors to sought deals and agreements to overcome these challenges.
Ultimately, however, such deals would not be enough to provide viable financial restructuring.
a.

Market Conditions

The Debtors pointed to challenging market conditions, including the H1N1 Swine Flu
break out and the deterioration of the U.S. and world economy in 2008 and 2009 as factors that
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exacerbated an over-leveraged balance sheet, which contributed to their need to file Chapter 11.
i.

Swine Flu

The CDC estimated that 14 million to 34 million cases of H1N1 Swine Flu cases occurred
between April and October 2009.190 Furthermore, the CDC estimated that 63,000 to 153,000
cases of H1N1 Swine Flu cases resulted in hospitalization and 2,500 to 6,000 cases of H1N1
Swine Flu resulted in death.191 The severity of the H1N1 Swine Flu virus threat and the
corresponding media coverage surrounding it helped to cause a decline in ticket sales and
attendance at Six Flags theme parks, particularly at the Company’s Texas and Mexico theme
parks.192 In April 2009, the epidemic led to the closing of Six Flags Mexico for almost two
weeks by order of the Mexican government.193
ii.

The Great Recession

Most economists agree that, though mid-2007 to 2009 was a far cry from a full scale
Depression, it was the worst recession that the United States has experienced since the Great
Depression of the 1930’s.194 In 2008 real GDP of the U.S. increased by a meager 0.4%, and it
decreased by 2.4% in 2009.195 The unemployment numbers were even bleaker. In 2008,

Updated CDC Estimates of 2009 H1N1 Influenza Cases, Hospitalizations and Deaths in the
United States, April 2009 – April 10, 2010, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
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190

191

Id.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT FOR DEBTORS’ JOINT PLAN OF REORGANIZATION UNDER CHAPTER
11 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, at 42, In re Premier International Holdings, Inc., et. al., Case
No. 09-12019 (Bankr. Del. 2009) (No. 240).

192

193

Id.

Chris Isidore, The Great Recession, CNN MONEY, (May 25, 2009), http://
money.cnn.com/2009/03/25/news/economy/depression_comparisons/.
194

Gross Domestic Product: Fourth Quarter 2009 (Third Estimate) and Corporate Profits, 4th
Quarter 2009, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, (March 26, 2010), https://www.bea.gov/
newsreleases/national/gdp/2010/gdp4q09_3rd.htm.

195

Restructuring a Theme Park: The Six Flags Bankruptcy

34

unemployment increased from 5.0% to 7.8% by the end of the year.196 In 2009, that number
increased to 10.0% by October.197 The rising unemployment and general deterioration of the
U.S. and international economies resulted in the decline of attendance, ticket sales, and consumer
spending within the park.
b.

Exchange Offers

Debtors were unable to meet the approximately $318.8 million PIERS obligation due on
August 15, 2009, so the Debtor sought to refinance or restructure the mandatory redemption
date.198 This was particularly important because any default of the PIERS obligations would also
have resulted in a default of the Pre-Petition Credit Agreement and a potential acceleration of the
obligations thereunder.199 Likewise, if the Lenders were to accelerate the obligations under the
Pre-Petition Credit Agreement, there could be a default under all of the Unsecured Notes.200
This would result in potentially all of the Debtor’s long-term debt becoming due and payable
immediately.201 Therefore, Debtors proposed to exchange the Unsecured Notes for Debtor’s
common stock.202 The proposed exchange was conditioned on participation of at least 95% of
the aggregate principal amount of each issue of Unsecured Notes.203 The Debtors also
considered a similar agreement that would have converted the PIERS into shares of common
stock, but when it became clear that 95% of the aggregate principal amount of each issue of
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Unsecured Notes would not participate in the exchange, the Debtors decided against any PIERS
amendment.204 The Debtors believed that, due to the adverse market conditions previously
discussed, the offers of exchange and amendment would not have been adequate to resolve their
financial issues.205
c.

Negotiations with Avenue Capital Management

In an alternative attempt to resolve their financial issues, the Debtors entered into
negotiations with Avenue Capital Management (“Avenue”), as they were the largest holders of
2016 Notes, a significant holder of the other Unsecured Notes, and lender under the Pre-Petition
Credit Agreement.206 The hope was that the negotiations could result in a pre-negotiated chapter
11 bankruptcy filing.207 The goals of the negotiation were to convert the 2016 Notes into the
majority of the equity of any reorganized entity and a reinstatement of the Prepetition Credit
Agreement.208
During negotiations, the Debtors realized that, even with the proposed de-leveraging, an
injection of an additional $200 million of capital would be required to ensure that the Debtor’s
had sufficient liquidity for seasonal business.209 Even with an additional $200 million, the
Debtor’s would be exposed to a potential liquidity shortfall if the Partnership Park “puts”
occurred at maximum permitted levels.210 In response to the request of the additional capital,
Avenue proposed debt funding of $175 million on a delayed-draw basis, with high interest and

204

Id.

205

Id.

206

Id.

207

Id.

208

Id.

209

Id.

210

Id.

Restructuring a Theme Park: The Six Flags Bankruptcy

36

significant fees that were inconsistent with market terms.211 Avenue proposed two more
alternatives, each of which were not consistent with market terms and did not meet the $200
million minimum capitalization, before the negotiations were abandoned.212
d.

Prepetition Restructuring Agreement

In of 2009 the Debtors began negotiations with the other lenders under the Prepetition
Credit Agreement (“Prepetition Lenders”) while they were negotiating with Avenue and with
Avenue’s knowledge.213 By early June 2009, the Debtors and the other Prepetition Lenders had
agreed on basic restructuring terms that would convert the obligations under the Prepetition
Credit Agreement into the majority of the equity of the reorganized Debtors.214 In addition,
under this agreement the Prepetition Lenders would permit the Debtors to obtain a new $150
million revolving or multi-draw term credit facility to meet the Debtors liquidity needs for its
seasonal business.215 The Debtors believed that this proposal was feasible and had a high
likelihood of being approved. The Prepetition Lenders agreed to support the proposal so long as
the (i) the financial restructuring would occur through a pre-negotiated chapter 11, (ii) the
Debtors would adhere to the negotiated timeline for the restructuring, and (iii) the Debtors would
adhere to the general terms that will be described infra.216
C.

Filing the Petition

Finally, after months of negotiating with lenders in order to find alternative methods to
resolve the Debtors’ financial issues, Premier International Holdings, Inc. (“Premier”) filed a
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voluntary petition for chapter 11 bankruptcy on June 13, 2009 in the District of Delaware.217
Premier retained the services of Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A., specifically Daniel J.
Defranceschi, to file the petition.218 The Chief Financial Officer of Six Flags, Inc., Mr. Jeffrey
R. Speed, signed the petition on behalf of the Debtor.219
Premier listed itself as a corporation with between 1 and 49 creditors, assets in an amount
between $10,000,001 and $50 million, and liabilities in an amount between $1,000,001 and $10
million.220 Premier further stated that its debts were business debts and that it estimated that
funds were available for distribution to unsecured creditors.221 With the petition, Premier also
filed a list of affiliates that had pending bankruptcy cases filed in the District of Delaware, a
written consent from Premier’s Board of Directors, a list of Premier’s 20 largest creditors, and a
list of equity holders.222
D.

First Day Motions

On June 13, 2009, the date of the filing, the Debtors filed a series of “first day motions”. These
motions sought various forms of relief in order to minimize any disruption of the Debtors’
business operations and to facilitate the reorganization process.223 Listed below are some of the
more notable first day motions filed.
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Case Administration
i.

Motion for Joint Administration

There were 37 Debtors seeking joint administration.224 The Debtors’ stated reasons for
submitting a motion for joint administration were (i) to avoid duplicative notices, motions, and
pleadings, thereby saving time and expense, (ii) significantly reducing the volume of pleadings,
(iii) minimize unnecessary delays, and (iv) protect creditors of each individual Debtor from
potential conflicts of interest.225
b.

Critical Obligations
ii.

Motion to Pay Pre-Petition Wages, Benefits, Business Expenses, and
Related Items

At the time the Debtors filed their voluntary petition, they employed 1,636 full time
employees and approximately 28,400 seasonal employees.226 The Debtors’ owed the employees
wages, salaries, overtime pay, commissions, incentive pay and bonuses, contractual
compensation, severance, vacation pay, sick pay, holiday pay, and other accrued
compensation.227 The Debtors estimate that unpaid employee compensation amounts to
approximately $3,827,945, unpaid employee business expenses to $3,360,000, unpaid employee
benefits to $140,646, and other related obligations to employees to $1,834,023.228 Debtors
asserted that the obligations owed to employees were not so great as to deplete the assets for

MOTION OF THE DEBTORS AND DEBTORS IN POSSESSION FOR AN ORDER DIRECTING THE
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distribution to unsecured creditors.229
iii.

Motion to Pay Certain Pre-Petition Taxes

The Debtor’s requested to pay certain prepetition taxes, including all sales and use taxes,
franchise and real estate taxes, and any other taxes for which the Debtors’ officers and directors
may be personally liable.230 Most of the sales taxes were paid on a monthly basis, and those
taxes were approximately $5.8 million per month during peak season.231 As of the petition date,
Debtors owed approximately $670,000 in use taxes, $75,000 in franchise taxes, and $5.4 million
in property taxes.232 The Debtors stated that their reasons for requesting to pay pre-petition debt
were: 1) the prepetition taxes did not constitute a part of the Debtors’ estate, 2) almost all of the
prepetition taxes would constitute a priority claim that would be paid in full under any plan of
reorganization, 3) if certain of the prepetition taxes were not paid it would affect the Debtors’
ability to conduct business in certain jurisdictions, and 4) the Debtors’ officers might have faced
personal liability if some of the prepetition taxes were not paid.233
iv.

Motion to Pay Certain Critical Vendors

There were several providers of services and goods that were so critical that the Debtors
asserted that they could not operate the parks or maintain their infrastructure without them.234
Some of these vendors were claimed to be the only available source for a particular good or

229

Id.

MOTION OF DEBTORS AND DEBTORS IN POSSESSION FOR AUTHORIZATION TO PAY CERTAIN
PREPETITION TAXES, In re Premier International Holdings, Inc., et. al., Case No 09-12019
(Bankr. Del. 2009) (No. 9).
230

231

Id.

232

Id.

233

Id.

MOTION OF THE DEBTORS AND DEBTORS IN POSSESSION FOR INTERIM AND FINAL ORDERS
AUTHORIZING THE PAYMENT OF CERTAIN PREPETITION CLAIMS OF CRITICAL VENDORS, In re
Premier International Holdings, Inc., et. al., Case No. 09-12019 (Bankr. Del. 2009) (No. 5).
234

Restructuring a Theme Park: The Six Flags Bankruptcy

40

service required.235 Also, the Debtors made up the majority of the business of some of these
critical vendors, so they are reliant on each other.236 The Debtors asserted that the vendors
would stop providing their services if they did not pay their outstanding claims.237 If these
critical services were to stop, the Debtors asserted that their ability to operate during peak season
would diminish, their reputation would be harmed, their ability to maintain customer loyalty
would be undermined, and their restructuring efforts would be compromised.238
c.

Business Operations
i.
Motion to Prohibit Utility Companies from Altering, Refusing, or
Discontinuing Service

In this motion, the Debtors sought to prohibit utility companies currently providing service
as well as those who would later provide service from altering, refusing, or discontinuing that
service.239 Any such disruption would have hindered or prevented a successful reorganization
attempt. In support of the motion, the Debtors asserted that the utility companies had adequate
assurance of payment because the Debtors deposited a significant amount of cash with the utility
companies or in an account set aside for the payment of the utility companies, and the Debtors
established procedures to allow the utility companies to seek greater or different security for
additional assurance of payment.240
ii.

Motion to Maintain Certain Customer Programs

The Debtors used customer programs to obtain and develop a positive reputation of their
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parks and merchandise and attract new customers.241 Such programs included Season Passes,
Group Ticket Sales, as well as other discounts and premiums.242 In 2008, 28% of park
attendance could be attributed to season passes, and 29% of park attendance could be attributed
to group ticket sales.243 These figures showed the importance of the customer programs to the
continued operation of the parks.
iii. Motion to Pay Insurance Policies in the Ordinary Course of Business and
Other Obligations in Respect Thereof
The Debtors filed this motion in order to continue all prepetition insurance policies in the
ordinary course of business and to pay all obligations related to those insurance policies.244 The
Debtors asserted that the coverage provided by the insurance policies was necessary because it
preserved value of the Debtors’ assets and was under the various laws and contracts that govern
Debtors’ business operations.245 The Debtors’ obligations related to the insurance policies were
estimated to be approximately $3.3 million.246
d.

Financial Operations
i.
Motion to Maintain Existing Cash Management System and Bank
Accounts

The Debtors asserted that their corporate and park operations depended on the continued
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use of their existing cash management system.247 The centralized system allowed the Debtors to
control and monitor corporate funds, ensure cash availability, and reduce administrative
expenses by facilitating the movement of funds.248 If not permitted to use the existing system,
the Debtors believed that payments to certain critical vendors, contractors, and employees would
have been disrupted.249 The Debtors further stated in their motion that continued use of the cash
management system would help stabilize post-petition business operations and assist in
reorganization efforts.250
According to guidelines set forth by the U.S. Trustee for the District of Delaware, a
Chapter 11 debtor is required to close all existing bank accounts and open new debtor in
possession bank accounts.251 The Debtors seek to have this requirement waived because it
would cause enormous delays and disruptions to the Debtors’ business and efforts to
reorganize.252 The Debtors have over 100 bank accounts in North America alone that are part of
part of a carefully constructed cash management system, and just like any disruption to the cash
management system would potentially disrupt payments critical to the operation of the Debtors’
business, any disruption to the bank accounts that make up the cash management system would
potentially disrupt those payments.253

MOTION FOR ORDER UNDER 11 U.S.C. §§ 345, 363, 1107 AND 1108 AUTHORIZING (I)
CONTINUED USE OF EXISTING (A) CASH MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, (B) BANK ACCOUNTS, (C)
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Motion to Use Pre-Petition Cash Collateral

The Debtors requested the use of the lenders’ cash collateral, including that cash under the
Credit Agreement, because there was an urgent need of cash to continue operating the business
and to make all the necessary operating and restructuring expenses.254 Though the lenders had
already agreed to the Debtors’ use of the cash collateral, it was still necessary to propose
adequate protection for the lenders.255 The Debtors proposed to provide protection to the lenders
in the form of super-priority administrative claims, liens on post-petition collateral, continued
payment of interest and fees at the non-default rate with default interest to accrue on pre-petition
obligations, reimbursement of certain fees and expenses, and adherence to a budget with regular
reporting on the Debtors’ financial performance.256
E.

Creditors’ Committee

On June 26, 2009, the U.S. Trustee appointed 7 members to the Committee of Unsecured
Creditors.257 These appointments include John J. Gorman, The Coca-Cola Company, Esopus
Creek Value, The Bank of New York Mellon, Richard Schottenfeld, Whirley Industries, and
HSBC Bank USA, N.A.258 The Creditors’ Committee had 3 advisors including Brown Rudnick
LLP, Peter J. Solomon Company, and Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones.259
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The First Proposed Plan
a.

Classification of Creditors and Equity Holders

According to the Bankruptcy Code, the creditors and equity holders must be divided into
separate classes. Each class should represent a group that has substantially similar interests and
legal status as to the debtor. In this case, the creditors and equity holders were divided up into 18
classes.260 Of those classes, 5 would not be impaired by the proposed plan, and 13 would be
impaired.261 Those classes that would have their legal, equitable, or contractual rights altered
included Class 4 (SFTP Prepetition Credit Agreement Claims), Class 5 (SFTP TW Guaranty
Claims), Class 6 (SFTP TW Indemnity Claims), Class 9 (SFO Prepetition Credit Agreement
Claims), Class 10 (SFO TW Guaranty Claims), Class 11 (SFO TW Indemnity Claims), Class 12
(SFI TW Guaranty Claims), Class 13 (SFI TW Indemnity Claims), Class 14 (SFI Unsecured
Claims), Class 15 (Subordinated Securities Claims), Class 17 (Preconfirmation SFO Equity
Interests), and Class 18 (Preconfirmation SFI Equity Interests).262 As stated in the Bankruptcy
Code, these impaired classes had the right to vote on the confirmation of the chapter 11 plan and
the right to receive no less than they would under a Chapter 7 liquidation of the Debtors.263
b.

Treatment of Claims Under the First Proposed Plan
i.

Unclassified Claims

The claims that fall under this category include administrative expense claims, professional
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compensation and reimbursement claims, and priority tax claims.264 These claims are
unimpaired, and as such they are deemed to have accepted the Chapter 11 Plan.265
ii.

Class 1: Other Priority Claims

The claims that fall under “Other Priority Claims” include certain wages, salaries, and
other compensation obligations to the Debtors’ employees that fall under Section 507(a)(4), (5),
(6), and (7) of the Bankruptcy Code.266 Under the plan, each holder of such a claim will receive
cash in an amount equal to his or her claim.267 This class in considered unimpaired, and
therefore, deemed to have accepted the terms of the Chapter 11 Plan268.
iii.

Class 2: Secured Tax Claims

Class 2 was among the unimpaired classes and those claims were deemed to have accepted
the plan. Included in Class 2 were any secured claims that, without its secured status, would be
entitled to priority in right of payment under Sections 502(i) and 507(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy
Code.269 Under the Plan, all holders of a Class 2 claim will receive cash equal to the amount of
the claim or semi-annual cash payments over a 5-year period in an amount equal to the claim.270
iv.

Class 3: Other Secured Claims

This class was another of the unimpaired classes. It included all secured claims other the
Secured Tax Claims, SFTP Prepetition Credit Agreement Claims, and SFO Prepetition Credit

DEBTORS’ JOINT PLAN FOR REORGANIZATION UNDER CHAPTER 11 OF THE BANKRUPTCY
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Agreement Claims.271 However, The Debtors believed that the amount of such claims would be
$0, and so this class was not important.272
v.

Class 4: SFTP Prepetition Credit Agreement Claims

This is the first of the unimpaired classes. Those claims that fall into this class included
any claims held against SFTP and SFTP subsidiaries by Prepetition Lenders under the
Prepetition Credit Agreement.273 Under the Chapter 11 Plan, each of these claims will receive its
ratable proportion of the New Term Loan and its ratable proportion of 92% of newly issued
common stock.274 The stock will be subject to dilution by the Long Term Incentive Plan.275
vi.

Class 5: SFTP TW Guaranty Claims

This class included any claims that arose under SFTP’s guaranty of obligations owed to
Time Warner and its affiliates under the TW Loan.276 However, the claims had a maximum
aggregate amount of $10 million.277 Under the plan, SFTP’s guaranty of the obligations would
be discharged and Time Warner would receive a new guaranty of the obligations from the
reorganized SFTP.278
vii.

Class 6: SFTP TW Indemnity Claim

This class included any claims that arose under SFTP’s guaranty of obligations to Time
Warner and its affiliates under the Subordinated Indemnity Agreement.279 Under the plan, those
obligations will be discharged and a new guaranty of the obligations under the Subordinated
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Indemnity Agreement shall be made by the reorganized SFTP.280
viii. Class 7: Subsidiary Unsecured Claims
Class 7 is another of the unimpaired classes and each holder of such claims is deemed to
have accepted the plan.281 This class included any claim against the Debtors other than an
Administrative Expense Claim, Priority Tax Claim, Other Priority Claim, Secured Tax Claim,
Other Secured Claim, Prepetition Credit Agreement Claim, TW Guaranty Claim, TW Indemnity
Claim, Subordinated Securities Claim, or Intercompany Claim.282 At the option of the
reorganized Debtors, each Class 7 claim will be reinstated, and each holder of a Class 7 claim
will be paid in full in cash on the distribution date or soon thereafter.283
ix.

Class 8: SFO Prepetition Credit Agreement Claims

This class included all claims against SFO that arose under the Prepetition Credit
Agreement.284 Under the Plan, any guaranty made by SFO of the obligations under the
Prepetition Credit Agreement would be discharged and replaced by a new guaranty by the
reorganized Debtors under the New Term Loan.285
x.

Class 9: SFO TW Guaranty Claims

This class included any claims arising under SFO’s obligation to Time Warner and certain
affiliates under the TW Loan, up to a maximum of $10,000,000.286 Under the Plan, SFO’s
guaranty of the obligations under the TW Loan would be discharged in exchange for a new
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guaranty of the obligations by the reorganized Debtors.287
xi.

Class 10: SFO TW Indemnity Claims

This class included any claims against SFO arising under the guaranty by SFO of
obligations to Time Warner and certain affiliates under the Subordinated Indemnity
Agreement.288 Under the Plan, SFO’s guaranty of the obligations under the Subordinated
Indemnity Agreement would be discharged in exchange for a new guaranty by the reorganized
Debtors.289
xii.

Class 11: SFO Unsecured Claims

Included in this class were any unsecured claims against SFO, including the 2016 Notes.290
Under the Plan, each holder of a Class 11 claim would receive a pro rata distribution of 7% of
newly issued stock in the reorganized Debtors, subject to dilution by the Long-Term Incentive
Plan.291
xiii. Class 12: SFI TW Guaranty Claims
Included in this class were any claims against the Debtors that arose under SFI’s guaranty
of obligations owed to Time Warner and certain affiliates under the TW Loan up to $10
million.292 Under the Plan, SFI’s guaranty of the obligations under the TW Loan would be
discharged in exchange for a new guaranty of the obligations by the reorganized Debtors.293
xiv. Class 13: SFI TW Indemnity Claims
Included in this class were any claims against the Debtors that arose under SFI’s guaranty
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of obligations owed to Time Warner and certain affiliates under the Subordinated Indemnity
Agreement.294 Under the Plan, the guaranty of obligations under the Subordinated Indemnity
Agreement would be discharged and exchanged for a new guaranty by the reorganized
Debtors.295
xv.

Class 14: SFI Unsecured Claims

Included in this class were any unsecured claims against SFI, including 2010 Notes, 2013
Notes, 2014 Notes, 2015 Notes, and SFI’s guaranty of the 2016 Notes.296 Under the Plan, any
holder of Unsecured SFI Claims will receive a pro rata share of 1% of newly issued common
stock of the reorganized Debtors.297
xvi. Class 15: Subordinated Securities Claims
These Claims included any claim against the Debtors (i) arising from the rescission of a
purchase or sale of stock, debt, or any other securities of the Debtors or affiliates, (ii) for
damages from the purchase or sale of any security, (iii) for violations of the securities laws,
misrepresentations, or other similar claims, or (iv) for reimbursement, contribution, or
indemnification allowed under the Bankruptcy Code on account of any such claims.298 This
class is not important, however, as the Debtors estimated that such Class 15 claims would
amount to $0.299
xvii. Class 16: Preconfirmation Subsidiary Equity Interests
Class 16 was among the 5 unimpaired classes. Included in this class were any instruments
that evidenced an ownership interest in the Debtors, other than SFI or SFO, and all options,
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warrants, or rights to acquire interests.300 Under the Plan, all such interest shall be reinstated.301
xviii. Class 17: Preconfirmation SFO Equity Interests
Class 17 included all instruments that evidenced an ownership interest in SFO, and all
options, warrants, or rights to acquire such an interest.302 Under the Plan, all SFO equity
interests would be cancelled, and any holder of a Class 17 interest would not be entitled to any
property or interest on account of such cancellation.303
xix. Class 18: Preconfirmation SFI Equity Interests
Class 18 included all instruments that evidenced an ownership interest in SFI, and all
options, warrants, or rights to acquire such an interest.304 Under the Plan, all SFI equity interests
would be cancelled, and any holder of a Class 18 interest would not be entitled to any property or
interest on account of such cancellation.305
G.

Objections and Amendments to the Proposed Plan
a.

Amendments to the Proposed Plan

The original proposed plan was first amended in August, though very little was changed
except some additions regarding the Debtors’ financial condition and business projections.306
The second amendment to the proposed plan increased amount of distribution of the SFO and
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SFI unsecured note holders.307 The distribution to the SFO note holders was increased from a
pro rata share of 7% of the newly issued common stock to a pro rata share of 69.77% share of
newly issued common stock, and the distribution to the SFI note holders was increased from a
pro rata share of 1% of the newly issued common stock to a pro rata share of 7.34% of the newly
issued common stock.308 In addition to increasing the amount of distribution to the SFO and SFI
note holders, the second amended plan also created a new class that included unsecured claims
against a subsidiary called Funtime, Inc.309 The third and fourth amendments to the proposed
plan only added technical amendments and additional disclosures.310
b.

Objection by the Committee of Unsecured Creditors

In March 2010 the Committee of Unsecured Creditors filed an objection to the fourth
amended proposed plan.311 In the filed objection, the asserted reasons for the objection were an
undervaluation of the Debtors, which resulted in in excess distributions to SFO note holders at
the expense of SFI creditors.312 To resolve the problem, Debtors entered into negotiations with
the Committee of Unsecured Creditors, which resulted in an Agreement in Principle.313 Under
the Agreement in Principle, which was incorporated in the modified fourth amendment to the
proposed plan, the SFO note holders would receive cash distributions equal to the share of their
claims, and SFI note holders would receive a pro rata share of 9.5% of newly issued common
DEBTORS’ SECOND AMENDED JOINT PLAN OF REORGANIZATION UNDER CHAPTER 11 OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE, at 22-23, In re Premier International Holdings, Inc., et. al., Case No.
09-12019 (Bankr. Del. 2009) (No. 944).
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stock.314
c.

Resilient Capital Management, LLC

In April, Resilient Capital Management, LLC filed a motion with the court to participate in
the confirmation hearing regarding the Debtors’ plan of reorganization.315 Resilient, a large
holder of PIERS, asserted that the Debtor were undervalued according to the plan of
reorganization, and if properly valued they would have enough to make distributions to the
holders of PIERS.316 Unfortunately for Resilient, the court rejected Resilient’s request and
confirmation went ahead as planned.317
H.

Voting and Confirmation

Classes 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 13, 17, and 18 were unimpaired and, therefore, deemed to
have accepted the plan for reorganization.318 Classes 15, 16, and 19 are impaired and deemed to
have rejected.319 Classes 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, and 14 were impaired and voted to accept the plan.320
The court filed its order confirming the Debtors’ plan of reorganization on April 30, 2010.321
Under the plan, Six Flags was able to cut its obligations to $1 billion from $2.7 billion, and a
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group of investors would buy $725 million worth of newly issued common stock.322 The
restructuring would be financed by a $1 billion of senior secured credit facilities, $120 million
revolving credit facilities, and a $150 million loan from Time Warner.323
V.

POST BANKRUPTCY
A.

After-affects

When the company emerged from bankruptcy, Snyder was out.324 In court documents
filed with the SEC and before the bankruptcy was finalized, it was specified that Shapiro would
retain a board seat with the ability to appoint the final director for the company “provided,
however, that such remaining director shall not be Daniel M. Snyder.”325 Nonetheless, Shapiro
and the rest of Snyder’s handpicked management team were gone shortly thereafter as well.326
In a statement regarding Shapiro’s departure, Snyder stated “Shapiro bravely led Six Flags
through an incredibly difficult period. He has been an energetic, optimistic leader and problem
solver… Most of all I admire his tenacious dedication to protect the interests of the 28,000 Six
Flags associates during this period of transition."327 Al Weber Jr., the former head of Paramount
Parks became Six Flags’ president and interim CEO while the company searched for a
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permanent replacement.328 In August of 2010, James Reid-Anderson was named the new
President and CEO of Six Flags, with Al Weber as the company’s new COO.329 Interestingly,
Reid-Anderson had no experience in the theme park industry.330 Instead, he came from the
engineering and electronics industry and was the former CEO of Siemens AG Healthcare
Diagnostics Division.331 Commentators downplayed his lack of relevant experience and focused
instead on information given in press releases, such as Reid-Anderson’s record of shareholder
value creation.332 The hope was that alongside Al Weber’s industry experience, the duo would
be able to build upon the momentum already underway at the parks.333
Similar to Shapiro’s previously expressed hopes that the recession would prove to be a
boost to the company’s revenues, investors were drawn to the company post-bankruptcy based
on predictions that it would benefit from a slow recovery as parents would choose “stay-cations”
over more expensive destinations.334 These predictions proved to be accurate and the company
saw revenue gains and increased attendance in the years following the bankruptcy. Six Flags had
been delisted from the New York Stock Exchange before it filed for bankruptcy because of the

Robert Niles, Mark Shapiro is Out at Six Flags; Former Paramount Parks Head Al Weber Is
In, THEME PARK INSIDER (May 12, 2010), http://www.themeparkinsider.com/
flume/201005/1921/.
328

Sandra Daniels, James Reid-Anderson Named Chairman, President and Chief Executive
Officer of Six Flags Entertainment Corporation, PR NEWSWIRE (Aug. 13, 2010), http://
www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/james-reid-anderson-named-chairman-president-and-chiefexecutive-officer-of-six-flags-entertainment-corporation-100615754.html.
329

Robert Niles, Six Flags Names New President/CEO, THEME PARK INSIDER (Aug. 13, 2010),
http://www.themeparkinsider.com/flume/201008/2057/.

330

331

Id.

Six Flags Entertainment Appoints James Reid-Anderson As Chairman, President And CEO –
Update, RTT NEWS (Aug. 13, 2010), http://www.rttnews.com/1393227/six-flags-entertainmentappoints-james-reid-anderson-as-chairman-president-and-ceo-update.aspx; Nathan Becker, Six
Flags Selects CEO, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Aug. 13, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703960004575427300556123806.
332

333

Id.

334

Hals, supra note 122.

Restructuring a Theme Park: The Six Flags Bankruptcy

55

company’s precarious debt situation and its failure to meet the NYSE’s listing criteria.335 On
May 3, 2010, nearly a year after it was delisted, the company emerged from bankruptcy and
simultaneously announced its intention to relist on the NYSE under its old ticker, SIX.336
The company posted strong second quarter results in August 2010, and stated that the
company saw a revenue increase of 7%, and an adjusted EBITDA increase of 68%.337 The
company also highlighted its strong liquidity position, stating that it had a cash balance of $210
million as of August 1, 2010.338 Increased attendance, sponsorship, top line growth, and
effective cost management along with the new management team’s focus on theme park
excellence and shareholder value creation were cited as reasons for the growth.339 The company
reported similar strong performance during the following year, with revenue growth of 5%, and
an adjusted EBITDA increase of 20%.340 The management team credited the identification of
several large areas of revenue growth opportunities and the achievement of industry-leading
margins such as improved ticket yields, cost management, and a more cohesive marketing plan
as reasons for the strong results.341 The following two years the company reported similar gains,
again citing solid attendance growth along with a substantial tax benefit for the strong
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earnings.342
Six Flags most recent stock price is down 0.35% to $39.77 a share.343 However, the price
is up 6.47% year-over-year from $37.35 last year.344 In fact, the theme park operator’s current
market standing could be characterized as surprising given former projections that the company
would be looking at a loss of 20 cents per share during the fourth quarter of 2013.345 In
February, the company actually reported a revenue increase year-over-year, delivering a
substantial 15 cent per share profit.346 This is particularly significant because the company has
historically experienced a loss during the fourth quarter due to the highly seasonal nature of the
industry.347 Nevertheless, this development not only breaks a streak of two consecutive quarter
losses, but also shows that the company may be well-positioned for the 2014 fiscal year.348
Despite strong revenue numbers, there are still some naysayers. Some commentators
believe that the parks should have actually posted greater revenues due to the improving
economic climate and that the revenue increase of 4% was a result of higher admission prices
and in-park spending, and not the result of greater than average attendance.349 Critics often point
to the Disney parks as the standard by which all theme parks should constantly be striving to

Sandra Baker, Six Flags Reports Strong Fourth-Quarter Profits, STAR-TELEGRAM, at 1 (Feb.
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mimic. Although Six Flags can hardly be expected to spend the kind of money that Disney does
in investing in new attractions, the small perks like the ability to reserve expedited ride lines, or
larger perks designed to appeal to more affluent guests such as gourmet food offerings, are the
sort of Disney-imitating changes that some believe would improve Six Flag’s bottom line.350
Other commentators have praised the company’s changes since the bankruptcy in 2009, noting
that the park now hosts outside advertisers and brands within the park, and have strategically cut
out products that were not selling well and offering new, more appealing options.351
The company’s current CEO, Jim Reid-Anderson, has noted that guest-satisfaction scores
were at a record high last year, “our guests recognize we are providing innovative rides and
attractions, superb service, and great value for their money.”352 Not all customers agree with
Reid-Anderson’s estimation and believe the parks are still overpriced with regard to relative
value. Some customers continue to report feeling “gouged.”353 One reviewer stated that she felt
like “Six Flags was trying to shake enough money out of me to singlehandedly keep them
solvent.”354 She noted that since the company’s emergence from bankruptcy, “their financials
give some telling insight into my expensive experience.”355 The commentator also discussed a
recent Wall Street Journal article concerning the parks’ higher single-day ticket margins, stating
Six Flags Entertainment, Whole Foods Market, TriQuint Semiconductor, RF Micro Devices
and Apple highlighted as Zacks Bull and Bear of the Day, YAHOO FINANCE (Feb. 26, 2014),
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“Six Flags knows they don’t offer an attractive enough experience to get you to return
throughout the season, so they have to zap your wallet the first time you go.”356 Regardless of
criticism of the parks, Reid-Anderson is credited with achieving the noteworthy turnaround of
the company, an occurrence directly attributable to his carefully carried out strategy to invest in
every park.357 The investment has paid off not only in terms of attendance numbers, but has also
served to significantly increase overall morale at the parks.358
Despite the overwhelmingly good news regarding the park’s record-breaking quarter, the
company has recently dealt with an unfortunate and tragic event at its park in Arlington where a
woman fell to her death from a roller coaster named the Texas Giant in July of 2013.359 The
family of the decedent, 52-year old Rosa Esparza, filed suit against Six Flags seeking a minimum
of $1 million in damages for wrongful death due to alleged negligence.360 Six Flags filed a
cross-claim against the German roller coaster manufacturer, maintaining that the manufacturer
and not the park were at fault for the accident.361 Along with bad publicity, the park hosted
significantly fewer guests at the Texas location due to the tragedy, and has estimated litigation
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costs to be around $3 million.362 Nevertheless, the company reported that guest satisfaction
scores which include safety ratings, were at record highs during the past year.363
In Six Flag’s most recent quarterly earnings call on April 23, CEO Reid-Anderson
specifically highlighted a 7% growth in guest spending per cap, which he credited to ticket
pricing and in-park revenue strategies.364 In addition, he stated that the company’s Active Pass
Base has grown 25%.365 He described the “Active Pass Base” as a new term representing the
combined total active season pass holders and guests on the company’s membership plan, which
reflect the company’s success in emphasizing membership plans.366 Furthermore, membership
plans that renew automatically after one year create a recurring revenue and cash flow stream
for
the company.367 Reid-Anderson stated that these developments encourage an optimistic outlook
for the 2014 season and beyond, “it all starts with delighting our guests ensuring they have fun
at
Six Flags, receive great value for their money and are eager to visit our parks again and
again.”368 A recently published independent survey was also mentioned, recognizing Six Flags
as a leader in guest satisfaction compared to all regional theme parks.369 Another high point was
the company’s recent offering of an all-season dining pass that has turned out to be extremely
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successful with customers, resulting in considerable profits.370 During the 2014 season the park
will also introduce several record-breaking rides, including a ride at Six Flags Great Adventure
in New Jersey that has the distinction of being the tallest drop ride in the world, and a wooden
roller coaster named Goliath at Six Flags Great America near Chicago that breaks several world
records for speed, drop steepness, and drop depth.371
In the call’s question and answer session, Reid-Anderson alluded to potential
international expansion but was vague about the company’s specific plans for overseas locations.
In response to direct questions about licensing opportunities outside North America he stated
“the number [of theme parks] will increase… there is a growing middle-class… across the
world and when you look at Asia, especially the Middle East, now there is more disposable
income.”372 According to the company’s CFO, John Duffey, who fielded questions toward the
end of the call, Six Flags is currently in discussions with real estate developers to gauge interest
in plans to sell excess land.373 Responding to whether the sale of excess land could result in a
sea change in leverage, Duffey stated that the company’s plans to monetize the land are
contingent on the real estate market, and would likely not produce significant change in terms of
the company’s leverage.374 In response to questions concerning whether the company had goals
to return additional capital to shareholders from fee-related revenue, Duffy affirmed that they
would consider returning additional capital to shareholders if they continue to see leverage
decline with EBITDA growth, and that the company is “very happy with where our leverage is
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today.”375 In closing, Reid-Anderson encouraged the call participants to “visit our beautiful
parks this season to experience all that we have to offer. You can rest assured that our team is
focused on delighting our guests and creating incremental shareholder value in the years
ahead.”376
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